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Differentially Private Cloud-Based Multi-Agent
Optimization with Constraints
M.T. Hale and M. Egerstedt†
Abstract
We present an optimization framework that solves constrained multi-agent optimization problems while keeping
each agent’s state differentially private. The agents in the network seek to optimize a local objective function in
the presence of global constraints. Agents communicate only through a trusted cloud computer and the cloud also
performs computations based on global information. The cloud computer modifies the results of such computations
before they are sent to the agents in order to guarantee that the agents’ states are kept private. We show that under
mild conditions each agent’s optimization problem converges in mean-square to its unique solution while each agent’s
state is kept differentially private. A numerical simulation is provided to demonstrate the viability of this approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent optimization problems arise naturally in a variety of settings including wireless sensor networks
[14], [20], robotics [19], communications [13], [4], and power systems [2]. A number of approaches to solving
such problems have been proposed. In [16], a distributed approach was introduced in which each agent relies
only on local information in a time-varying network to solve convex optimization problems with non-differentiable
objective functions. In [22] the authors present a distributed implementation of Newton’s method to solve network
utility maximization problems. In [17], a distributed approach to solving consensus and set-constrained optimization
problems over time-varying networks is proposed.
In the current paper, we consider inequality constrained multi-agent optimization problems and add the additional
requirement that each agent’s state value be kept private. In [8] we proposed a cloud-based architecture for multi-
agent optimization (without privacy) in which a cloud computer is used to handle communications and necessary
global computations. We use this architecture as our starting point, though we change the cloud’s role substantially
so that it keeps each agent’s state differentially private.
The notion of differential privacy was first established in the database literature as a way of providing strong
practical guarantees of privacy to users contributing personal data to a database [5], [6]. Essentially differential
privacy guarantees that any query of a database does not change by much if a single element of that database
changes or is deleted, thereby concealing individual database entries. One appealing aspect of differential privacy is
that post-processing cannot weaken its privacy guarantees, allowing for the results of differentially private queries to
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be freely processed [7]. In addition, differential privacy guarantees that an entry in a database cannot be determined
exactly even if a malicious adversary has any arbitrary side information, e.g., other database entries [12].
Recently, differential privacy was extended to dynamical systems in [15]. Roughly, a system is differentially private
if input signals which are close in the input space produce output signals which are close in the output space. This
definition provides the same resilience to post-processing and protection against adversaries with arbitrary side-
information mentioned above. It is this form of differential privacy which we apply here to constrained multi-agent
optimization.
In the context of optimization, differential privacy has been applied in a number of ways. It was used to carry
out optimization of piecewise-affine functions in [9] to keep certain terms in the objective functions private. In
[11], the authors solve a distributed optimization problem in which the agents’ objective functions must be kept
private. In [10], differentially private linear programs are solved while constraints or the objective function are
kept private. In the current paper a saddle point finding algorithm in the vein of [8] is used to keep states private.
When computations are performed using this algorithm, noises are added in accordance with the framework for
differentially private dynamic systems set forth in [15] in order provide the guarantee of privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, Section II reviews the relevant results in the existing research
literature. Then Section III formulates the specific problem to be solved here and proves that it can be solved
privately. Next, Section IV provides simulation results to support the theoretical developments made. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESULTS
A. Problem Overview
Let there be a network of n agents indexed by i ∈ A, A = {1, . . . , n}. Let each agent have a scalar state xi ∈ R
and let each agent have a local, convex objective function fi : R→ R that is C2 in xi. The function fi is assumed
to be private in the sense that agent i does not share it with other agents or the cloud. Let the agents be subject to
m global inequality constraints, gj : R
n → R, where we require
gj(x) ≤ 0 (1)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Here x = (x1, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn contains all states in the network and we assume gj ∈ C2 is
a convex function in x for every j. We let x takes values in a nonempty, compact, convex set X ⊂ Rn and assume
that Slater’s condition holds, namely that there is some x¯ ∈ X satisfying g(x¯) < 0.
We can form an equivalent global optimization problem through defining a global objective function f by
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
fi(xi). (2)
Forming the Lagrangian of the global optimization problem, we have
L(x, µ) = f(x) + µT g(x), (3)
where µ is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker (KT) multipliers in the non-negative orthant of Rm, denoted Rm+ . By definition
L(·, µ) is convex and L(x, ·) is concave.
Seminal work by Kuhn and Tucker [21] showed that constrained optima of f subject to g are saddle points of
L. We assume that f has a unique constrained minimum and that the constrained minimum of f is a regular point
of g so that there is a unique saddle point of L [3]. The saddle point of L, denoted (xˆ, µˆ), satisfies the inequalities
L(xˆ, µ) ≤ L(xˆ, µˆ) ≤ L(x, µˆ) (4)
for all admissible x and µ. One method for finding saddle points from some initial point (x(0), µ(0)) is due to
Bakushinskii and Polyak [1]. Letting PX [·] denote the projection onto the set X and [·]+ the projection onto Rm+ ,
we can iteratively compute new values of x and µ according to
x(k + 1) = PX
[
x(k)− γ(k)
(
∇f(x(k))+ ∂g
∂x
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k) + α(k)x(k)
)]
(5)
and
µ(k + 1) =
[
µ(k) + γ(k)
(
g
(
x(k)
) − α(k)µ(k))]
+
. (6)
Above, k is the iteration number, and α(k) and γ(k) are defined as
γ(k) = γ¯k−c1 and α(k) = α¯k−c2 . (7)
The constants γ¯, α¯, c1, and c2 are selected by the user, with c1 and c2 subject to the conditions
0 < c2 < c1 and c1 + c2 < 1. (8)
One appealing aspect of the above method in this setting is its robustness to noise in the values of g and ∂g
∂x
.
Define G(x(k)) = g(x(k)) + wg(k) and ∂xG(x(k)) =
∂g
∂x
(
x(k)
)
+ w∂g(k), where wg(k) and w∂g(k) are i.i.d.
noises of the appropriate dimension. Then the noisy forms of Equations (5) and (6) are
x(k + 1) = PX
[
x(k)− γ(k)(∇f(x(k)) + ∂xG(x(k))Tµ(k) + α(k)x(k))
]
(9)
and
µ(k + 1) =
[
µ(k) + γ(k)
(
G(x(k)) − α(k)µ(k))]
+
. (10)
It is this noisy form of update rule that will be used in the remainder of the paper. We use it to define Algorithm
1, below.
Algorithm 1
Step 0: Select a starting point
(
x(0), µ(0)
) ∈ X × Rm and constants, α¯, γ¯, c1, and c2. Set k = 0.
Step 1: Compute
x(k + 1) = PX
[
x(k) − γ(k)(∇f(x(k))+ ∂xG(x(k))Tµ(k) + α(k)x(k))], (11)
µ(k + 1) =
[
µ(k) + γ(k)
(
G(x(k)) − α(k)µ(k))]
+
. (12)
Step 2: Set k = k + 1 and return to Step 1. △
For the purpose of analyzing the convergence of Algorithm 1, we have the following definition.
Definition 1: Let (xˆ, µˆ) denote the unique saddle point of the Lagrangian as defined in Equation (3). We say
Algorithm 1 converges if it generates a sequence
(
x(k), µ(k)
)
that converges in mean-square to (xˆ, µˆ) in the
Euclidean norm, i.e., if
lim
k→∞
E
(‖x(k)− xˆ‖22) = 0 (13)
and
lim
k→∞
E
(‖µ(k)− µˆ‖22) = 0. (14)
△
We now present the following theorem concerning the convergence of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 converges in the sense of Definition 1 if the following four conditions are met:
1) fi and gj are convex and C
1 for all i and j
2) X is a convex, closed, bounded set
3) Slater’s condition holds, i.e., there is some x¯ ∈ X such that g(x¯) < 0
4) all noises are zero mean, have bounded variance, and are independent at different points
Proof: See [18]. 
By assumption, Conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold. It remains to be shown that Condition 4 can hold when differential
privacy is desired. This will be shown in Section III. Below we describe an implementation of Algorithm 1 and
then cover differential privacy.
B. Cloud Architecture
Let the conditions and assumptions of Section II-A hold. In [8], a cloud-based architecture was used and it was
assumed that there was no inter-agent communication. This assumption is kept in force throughout this paper to
enable privacy of agents’ states. In this architecture, each agent stores and manipulates its own state xi(k) ∈ R.
Similarly, the cloud stores and updates µc(k), a vector of KT multipliers, as well as xc(k), the vector of each
agent’s state; it does not share xc(k) with the agents but instead only uses it to compute values of µc.
At each timestep k, the agents receive information from the cloud, update their states, and then send their updated
states to the cloud. At the same time that the agents are updating their states, the cloud is computing an update to
µc which will be sent to the agents in the next transmission the cloud sends. As mentioned above, the agents do
not talk to each other at all. The role of the cloud is to serve as a trusted central aggregator for information so that
computations based upon sensitive, global information, namely ∂g
∂xc
i
and updates to µc, can be computed and the
results disseminated to the agents without any agent ever directly knowing another agent’s state.
Before any optimization takes place, let agent i be initialized with fi, α¯, γ¯, X , c1, c2, and some initial state,
xi(0). Let the cloud be initialized with g,
∂g
∂xc
i
for every i, α¯, γ¯, c1, c2, and some initial KT vector, µ
c(0), that is
not based on the values of any initial states. To initialize the system, each agent sends its state to the cloud. Then at
each timestep, k, three actions occur. First, agent i receives a transmission containing private versions ∂g
∂xc
i
(
xc(k)
)
and µc(k) from the cloud (the details of the privacy will be explained in Section III). Second, agent i computes
xi(k+1), and simultaneously the cloud computes µ
c(k+1). Third, agent i sends xi(k+1) to the cloud, and then
this cycle of communication and computation is repeated with the newly computed values.
Writing out the update equations for a multi-agent implementation of Algorithm 1 using the cloud architecture,
we see that agent i updates according to
xi(k + 1) = PX
[
xi(k)− γ(k)
(
dfi
dxi
(
xi(k)
)
+ ∂xiG(x
c(k))Tµc(k) + α(k)xi(k)
)]
(15)
and the cloud updates according to
µc(k + 1) =
[
µc(k) + γ(k)
(
G(xc(k))− α(k)µc(k))]
+
, (16)
where ∂xiG(x
c(k)) = ∂g
∂xc
i
(
xc(k)
)
+wi(k) and, as before, G
(
xc(k)
)
= g(xc(k)) +wg(k). The distributions of all
noises wi and wg will be defined in Section III. In Equation (15), the notation µ
c(k) is meant to indicate that at
time k, agent i updates its state using the KT vector it just received from the cloud computer; before the cloud
computes a new value of µc, this KT vector is equal to the µ vector stored on the cloud at time k, µc(k), and
hence is denoted as such.
Due to the structure of communications in the system, agent i receives ∂xiG(x(k)) and µ
c(k) before computing
xi(k+1). Similarly, the cloud receives the agents’ states at time k (which end up being the contents of the vector
xc(k)) before computing µc(k + 1). Then despite the distributed nature of the problem, all information in the
network is synchronized whenever updates are computed anywhere. This means that, in aggregate, the steps taken
by the agents and cloud using Equations (15) and (16) are identical to those used in Algorithm 1 to solve the
global optimization problem defined in Section II-A. As a result, the analysis for the convergence of the cloud-
based implementation of Algorithm 1 will be carried out using the centralized form of Algorithm 1 as presented
in Section II-A, and it will apply to the cloud-based problem.
C. Differential Privacy for Dynamic Systems
Let there be n input signals to a system, each contributed by some user. Let the ith input signal be denoted
ui ∈ ℓsipi . Here si ∈ N is the dimension of the signal and, with an abuse of notation, we say ui ∈ ℓsipi if each finite
truncation of ui has finite pi-norm, i.e., if
u0:k := (u(0)
T , u(1)T , . . . , u(k)T )T (17)
has finite pi-norm for all k.
Using this definition, the full input space to the system is
ℓsp = ℓ
s1
p1
× ℓs2p2 × · · · × ℓsnpn , (18)
and the system generates outputs y ∈ ℓrq with q, r ∈ N. Fix a set of non-negative real numbers b = (b1, . . . , bn).
We define a symmetric binary adjacency relation, Adj(·, ·), on the space ℓsp such that
Adjb(u, u˜) = 1 if and only if ‖ui − u˜i‖pi ≤ bi, for some i and uj = u˜j for all j 6= i. (19)
In words, Adj(u, u˜) holds if and only if u and u˜ differ by (at most) one component and this difference is bounded
by the corresponding element of b. In this paper, we will focus exclusively on the case that pi = 2 for every i. The
symbol ‖ · ‖2 will be used for both the Euclidean norm and the ℓ2 norm, though the meaning of each use is clear
from context.
Roughly, differential privacy guarantees that if two input signals are adjacent, their output signals should not
differ by too much. As a result, small changes to inputs are not seen at the output and someone, e.g., a malicious
eavesdropper, with access to the output of the of the system cannot exactly determine the input. To make this notion
precise, let us fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let Rd denote the Borel σ-algebra defined on Rd. In the setting
of differentially private dynamic systems, a mechanism is a stochastic process M of the form
M : ℓsp × Ω→ ℓrq, (20)
i.e., M has inputs in ℓsp and sample paths in ℓ
r
q. We now state a lemma concerning differentially private mechanisms
for dynamical systems.
Lemma 1: A mechanism M : ℓsp × Ω → ℓrq is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every u, u˜ ∈ ℓsp
satisfying Adjb(u, u˜), we have
P
(
(Mu)0:k ∈ S
) ≤ eǫP((Mu˜)0:k ∈ S) + δ, ∀k ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ R(k+1)r . (21)
Proof: See [15], Lemma 2. 
Equation (21) captures in a precise way the notion that, at each time k, truncated outputs up until k that correspond
to adjacent inputs must have similar probability distributions, with the level of similarity of the outputs determined
by δ and ǫ. Indeed, the constants ǫ and δ determine the level of privacy afforded by the mechanism M to users
contributing input signals. Generally, ǫ is kept small, e.g., 0.1, ln 2, or ln 3. The parameter δ should be kept very
small because it allows a zero probability event for u˜ to be a non-zero probability event for u and thus controls
when there can noticeable differences in outputs which correspond to adjacent inputs. The choice of b determines
which inputs to the system should produce similar outputs and thus determines which inputs should “look alike”
at the output.
One appealing aspect of differential privacy is that its privacy guarantees cannot be weakened by post-processing.
Given the output of a differentially private mechanism, that output can be processed freely without threatening
the privacy of the inputs. In addition, this privacy guarantee holds even against an adversary with arbitrary side
information. Even if an adversary gains knowledge of, e.g., some number of inputs, that adversary still cannot
determine exactly the system’s other input signals by observing its outputs. In the present paper, Equation (21) will
be used as the definition of differential privacy and the reader is referred to [15] for a proof of Lemma 1.
Before discussing the mechanisms to be used here, we first define the ℓ2 sensitivity of a system; while the ℓp
sensitivity can be used for other values of p, we focus on p = 2 in this paper. Let G be a deterministic causal
system. The ℓ2 sensitivity is an upper bound, ∆2, on the norm of the difference between the outputs of G which
correspond to adjacent inputs. That is, ∆2 must satisfy
‖Gu− Gu˜‖2 ≤ ∆2 (22)
whenever Adjb(u, u˜) holds. There are several established differentially private mechanisms in the literature, e.g., [7,
Chapter 3], though here we will use only the Gaussian mechanism in the lemma below. In it, we use the Q-function,
defined as
Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du. (23)
Lemma 2: The mechanism Mu = Gu + w is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if w ∼ N (0, σ2Ir), where Ir is the
identity matrix of the same dimension as the output space, ℓrq , and where σ satisfies
σ ≥ ∆2κ(δ, ǫ) (24)
where we define Kδ = Q−1(δ) and
κ(δ, ǫ) :=
1
2ǫ
(
Kδ +
√
K2δ + 2ǫ
)
. (25)
Proof: See [15]. 
We will use κ(δ, ǫ) in Equation (25) for the remainder of the paper. Lemma 2 says in a rigorous way that adding
noise to the true output of a system can make it differentially private, provided the distribution from which the
noise is drawn has large enough variance. Also from Lemma 2, we see that once ǫ and δ are chosen, we need only
to find the ℓ2 sensitivity of a system, ∆2, to calibrate the level of noise that must be added to guarantee differential
privacy. We do this in the next section for the optimization problem outlined above.
III. PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
Based on the optimization algorithm devised in Section II and the cloud-based architecture, it is clear that two
pieces of information must be shared with agent i at each time k: ∂g
∂xc
i
(
x(k)
)
and µc(k). In order to keep the agents’
states private from each other, we must then alter these quantities, or the way in which they are computed, before
they are sent to the agents.
We regard each ∂g
∂xc
i
as a dynamic system with output yi(k) ∈ ℓm2 at time k, where m is the number of constraints
as defined in Section II-A. Noise is added to each yi before it is sent to the agents in order to guarantee differential
privacy of each agent’s state. While agent i will only make use of ∂g
∂xc
i
in its computations, we assume that each
agent has access to each output, i.e. agent i has knowledge of ∂g
∂xc
j
at each time even if j 6= i.
To ensure that no state values can be determined from µc, we use the resilience of differential privacy to post-
processing. Specifically, rather than adding noise to µc directly each time it is sent to the agents, we regard g as
a dynamic system and add noise to the value of g when computing µc in the cloud to guarantee that g keeps xc
differentially private. In doing this, µc then also keeps xc differentially private. In regarding g as a dynamical system
and setting yg(k) = g(x
c(k)), we see that its output yg ∈ ℓm2 , where m is the number of constraints as defined
above. In this framework, µc and each ∂g
∂xc
i
conceal each other agent’s state from agent i and any eavesdropper
intercepting the cloud’s transmissions to the agents.
To define differentially private mechanisms for ∂g
∂xc
i
, we first find bounds on the ℓ2 sensitivity of
∂g
∂xc
i
. By
assumption, g ∈ C2 so that ∂2g
∂x
c,2
i
is continuous. Also by assumption, X is compact so that
∥∥∥ ∂2g
∂x
c,2
i
(x)
∥∥∥
2
attains
its maximum on X . Denote this maximum by Kig′ . We see that Kig′ is the Lipschitz constant for ∂g∂xc
i
. Regarding
∂g
∂xc
i
as a system with inputs in Rn and outputs in Rm, we have the following theorem concerning a differentially
private mechanism whose output will be released to the agents.
Theorem 2: Let Kig′ be the Lipschitz constant of
∂g
∂xc
i
over the domain X and define B = maxi∈A{bi}. Then
the mechanism
M ig′x
c(k) =
∂g
∂xci
(
x(k)
)
+ wi(k) (26)
is differentially private with wi(k) ∼ N (0, σ2i Im), where m is the number of constraints, and with σi satisfying
σi ≥ κ(δ, ǫ)Kig′B. (27)
Proof: For two signals, x and x˜ in ℓsp, satisfying Adjb(x, x˜) for b = (b1, . . . , bn), we have∥∥∥∥ ∂g∂xci (x(k)) −
∂g
∂xci
(x˜(k))
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Kig′‖x(k)− x˜(k)‖2 ≤ Kig′‖x− x˜‖2 ≤ Kig′bi ≤ Kig′B. (28)
Using this bound on the ℓ2 sensitivity of
∂g
∂xc
i
, for each i ∈ A we define σi by
σi ≥ κ(δ, ǫ)Kig′B, (29)
with κ(δ, ǫ) defined as before. The theorem is then a straightforward application of Lemma 2. 
To keep the agents’ states private in releasing µ we rely on the resilience to post-processing of differential privacy
and compute µ using a differentially private form of g. As above, we note that ∂g
∂x
itself is continuous by assumption
and that there exists some Kg satisfying ∥∥∥∥∂g∂x(x)
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Kg (30)
for all x ∈ X . By definition, Kg is the Lipschitz constant of g and we use this to define a mechanism for making g
private in the next theorem below. We omit the proof of this theorem due to its similarity to the proof of Theorem
2 above.
Theorem 3: Let Kg be the Lipschitz constant of g over X and define B = maxi∈A{bi}. Then the mechanism
Mgx
c(k) = g
(
xc(k)
)
+ wg(k) (31)
is differentially private with wg(k) ∼ N (0, σ2gIm), where m is the number of constraints, and with σg satisfying
σg ≥ κ(δ, ǫ)KgB. (32)

Under the assumptions already made in crafting the optimization problem in Section II, conditions 1 − 3 of
Theorem 1 are satisfied. To satisfy condition 4 of Theorem 1, we need only to select values of σi and σg that
are bounded above. Then Algorithm 1 will converge. In addition, as long as σi and σg are bounded below
as in Equations (29) and (32), respectively, the conditions for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy are simultaneously met.
Importantly, Algorithm 1 is robust to noise appearing in exactly the places it is injected for privacy. Adding more
noise will increase the time required for Algorithm 1 to converge and thus there is a natural trade-off: increased
privacy results in a slower convergence rate because more noise is added, while decreased privacy allows for faster
convergence because it reduces the noise added.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A numerical simulation was conducted to support the theoretical developments of this paper. The problem here
involves n = 7 agents and m = 4 constraints. The set X = [−10, 10]7. This set can represent, e.g., the area a team
of robots must stay inside in order to maintain communication links. The constraint function g was chosen to be
g(x) =


x1 + x2 + x3 − 3
x25 +
1
12x
4
6 +
1
12x
4
7 − 20
x23 + x4 + x6 − 1
x26 + x
2
7 − 5


. (33)
Over X , the Lipschitz constant of g was found to be approximately Kg = 472.567. Each dynamic system ∂g∂xc
i
and
its Lipschitz constant over the domain X is listed in Table I.
i
∂g
∂xc
i
Ki
g′
1 (1, 0, 0, 0)T 0
2 (1, 0, 0, 0)T 0
3 (1, 0, 2x3, 0)T 2
4 (0, 0, 1, 0)T 0
5 (0, 2x5, 0, 0)T 2
6 (0, 1
3
x3
6
, 1, 2x6)T 100.08
7 (0, 1
3
x3
7
, 0, 2x7)T 100.08
TABLE I: Derivatives of g and their Lipschitz constants
Although the Lipschitz constants in Table I are quite different, it was desired to have the level of privacy
guaranteed by each mechanism be identical. The values δ = 0.05 and ǫ = ln 3 were chosen to be used by all
systems, giving κ(δ, ǫ) = 1.7565. In addition, it was desired to make agent i’s state difficult to distinguish from a
ball of radius 1 around it in the space ℓ12, leading to the choice of bi = 1 for all i, giving
b = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)T . (34)
Using these values, the distributions of noises to be added to each ∂g
∂xc
i
were determined and are shown in Table II.
In addition, the noise added to g when computing µ was
wg ∼ N (0, 688971.6017I4), (35)
and the sum of the agents’ objective functions was
f(x) = (x1 − 9)2 + x1 + (x2 + 4)4 + (x3 − 1)8 + x24 + (x4 + 6) + (x5 + 3)6 + (x6 − 7)2 + (x7 − 5)2. (36)
For Algorithm 1, the values γ¯ = 0.0005, α¯ = 0.20, c1 =
1
3 and c2 =
1
4 were chosen. Having selected everything
needed, a simulation was run that consisted of 500, 000 timesteps. The primal and dual components of the saddle
Noise Distribution
w1 N (0, 0)
w2 N (0, 0)
w3 N (0, 12.3406I4)
w4 N (0, 0)
w5 N (0, 12.3406I4)
w6 N (0, 30900.7580I4)
w7 N (0, 30900.7580I4)
TABLE II: Distributions of noise added to each ∂g
∂xc
i
×10 5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Fig. 1: Values of ‖x(k)− xˆ‖ (jagged line) and ‖µ(k)− µˆ‖ (smooth line) for k = 1, . . . , 500, 000.
point of L were computed ahead of time to be approximately
xˆ = (7.591,−4.769, 0.178,−0.822,−2.863, 1.790, 1.340)T (37)
and
µˆ = (1.8139, 0, 0.6409, 2.7314)T. (38)
To illustrate the convergence of the algorithm, the values of ‖x(k)− xˆ‖2 and ‖µ(k)− µˆ‖2 for k = 1, . . . , 500, 000
are plotted in Figure 1. We see that the distance from x(k) to xˆ decreases almost monotonically in early iterations
and oscillates more later on, though there is a discernible decreasing trend while it oscillates. Similarly, we see that
the distance from µ(k) to µˆ also follows a generally decreasing trend over time. The error values after 200, 000
iterations were ‖x(200, 000)− xˆ‖2 = 0.4839 and ‖µ(200, 000)− µˆ‖2 = 0.5459, indicating close convergence to
the unique saddle point after the first 200, 000 iterations. Numerically, these distances to the optimum are generally
within the acceptable tolerance of error for many applications. For applications with tighter bounds on the required
distance to the optimum, the algorithm can simply be run for longer. In this case, after 500, 000 iterations the error
values were ‖x(500, 000)− xˆ‖2 = 0.2612 and ‖µ(500, 000)− µˆ‖2 = 0.2123, indicating noticeable decreases in the
level of sub-optimality in x(k) and µ(k).
The relative value of reducing oscillations and increasing privacy will vary between problems and should be
considered when designing problems and selecting ǫ, δ, and b. Regardless of the weight of these two objectives,
differentially private multi-agent optimization successfully converges when agents do not directly share their states,
and indeed converges when it is impossible for any agent to discover exactly any other agent’s state value.
V. CONCLUSION
A multi-agent optimization problem was considered in which it is desirable to keep each agent’s state private.
This was achieved via a primal-dual optimization method and by using differential privacy. It was shown that the
conditions required for differential privacy and for convergence of the optimization algorithm can be simultaneously
satisfied and thus that differentially private multi-agent optimization with constraints is possible. Numerical results
were then provided to attest to the viability of this approach.
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